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Abstract 
 
The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in 
bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and 
stability.  Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (Barth et al., 
2004, 2006, and 2008), we attempt to contribute to this assessment by examining whether  
bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. 
Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of more than 4,050 banks observations in 72 
countries over the time period 1999-2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities 
are negatively associated with bank efficiency while greater capital regulation stringency is 
marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency.  In addition, we find that a 
strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only 
in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with 
a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, 
market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively 
associated with bank efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Well-functioning banking systems exert a first-order impact on economic growth and 
development (e.g., see Levine 1997 and 2005). Banking systems, however, do not always 
function in a beneficial manner and thus at times fall short of achieving this important goal. 
The recent global financial crisis only serves to well as a reminder of this unpleasant fact. 
The response of policymakers to this and similar situations in the past is typically an 
assessment of what went wrong and what regulatory reforms can be made to promote better 
functioning banking systems. The breadth and depth of the most recent crisis certainly 
underscores the importance of such assessments. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the assessment of the types of reforms in 
bank regulation that work best to achieve well-functioning banking systems. Our assessment 
specifically focuses on the extent to which regulation enhances or impedes the ability of 
banks in countries everywhere to operate efficiently. While this is just one aspect of a well- 
functioning banking system it is certainly an important one. Policymakers can surely make 
more informed decisions about the regulation of banks when they know the likely affect of 
those decisions on the performance of banks. Despite the extensive literature on bank 
efficiency (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997, and Berger, 2007, for thorough reviews of the 
literature), a comprehensive study on whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring 
enhance or impede efficiency remains scarce. This is mainly due to limited data availability 
so as to obtain concrete measures on various aspects of international bank regulation and 
supervision schemes.  
This data limitation has been recently addressed by the three worldwide surveys on 
bank regulation and supervision conducted by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004, 2006 and 
2008) under the auspices of the World Bank over the past decade. The relevant bank 
regulation and supervision databases are compiled from the answers provided by the official 
regulatory and supervisory authorities to the surveys. The original survey, Survey I, provides 
information for the year 1999 and covers 117 countries. The second survey, Survey II, 
characterizes the regulatory environment for 2002, and covers 152 countries. Survey III is for 
2005/2006 and covers 142 countries. The surveys contain more than 300 questions regarding 
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a wide range of bank regulations and supervisory practices, such as capital regulation, entry 
regulation, activities restrictions, supervisory power and independence, external governance 
and private-sector monitoring.  Overall, the three surveys provide a very comprehensive and 
detailed picture of differences in bank regulation and supervision in countries around the 
world over the past decade, thereby providing an excellent opportunity to examine whether 
bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency. 
From a theoretical perspective, the predictions about the effects of regulation and 
supervision on banks are not clear. There are two general views that provide conflicting 
predictions, as explained more fully by Barth et al. (2006), among others. The ―public interest 
view‖ holds that the government acts in the interests of the public and regulates banks to 
promote efficient banking and ameliorate market failures. In contrast, the ―private interest 
view‖ holds that regulation is often used to promote the special interests of the few, not the 
broader public. According to the ―public interest view‖, well-structured regulation can 
enhance efficiency by fostering competition among banks and by encouraging effective 
governance of bank managers. But according to the ―private interest view‖, one would expect 
regulation to impede efficiency since it would constrain banks to cater to the politically 
favored or well connected. This implies that bank regulation will not play an active role in 
improving bank efficiency, but rather constrain banks to channel resources to special interest 
groups, such as politicians or their cronies. Given these two opposing views, and with similar 
conflicting predictions based on economic theory about the impact of specific regulations like 
capital requirements on bank performance, empirical studies become all the more important 
in helping inform policy decisions. 
 Building on these recently available bank regulation datasets, we examine an 
extensive and changing set of regulations and supervisory practices on bank efficiency using 
data for more than 4,050 banks in a broad cross-section of 72 countries over the time period 
1999-2007. The efficiency measures for the banks are constructed based on a widely adopted 
and non-parametric method to gauge the extent to which the performance of the individual 
banks deviates from that predicted for the ―best practice‖ banks (i.e., efficiency frontier). We 
then use these measures to examine whether regulation, supervision, and monitoring enhance 
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or impede bank efficiency.             
  Briefly, we find the following main results. First, with respect to bank regulation, 
we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank 
efficiency while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated 
with bank efficiency. One should therefore be aware that when tightening bank activities 
restrictions and strengthening bank capital requirements, which are mainly designed to reduce 
bank risk, there may be some potential efficiency loss. Second, regarding bank supervision, 
strengthening official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in 
countries with independent supervisory authorities. Furthermore, greater independence of the 
supervisory authority itself tends to enhance bank efficiency. This result is important as it 
suggests that greater independence of supervisory agencies from both politicians and banking 
firms enhances supervision effectiveness and bank efficiency. It also suggests that putting 
official supervisory power in the hands of independent supervisors might be helpful in 
improving the overall efficiency of banking systems. Finally, increased market-based 
monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency and better external audits is 
positively associated with bank efficiency, suggesting that the third pillar of Basel II can play 
an important and positive role in helping to improve bank efficiency. We obtain similar 
results in a dynamic setting, where we explore the impacts of changes in bank regulation and 
supervision schemes on the change of bank operating efficiency. Focusing on these changes 
is important to account for potential time-invariant unobservable factors that might affect 
both the regulation schemes and bank efficiency. Furthermore, as a check on potential 
endogeneity issues, we find our results to be robust to an instrumental variable analysis. 
In addition to these major findings, we also obtain some other interesting results. We 
find that greater bank competition, as measured by an asset (deposit) concentration ratio, 
enhances bank efficiency. The results echo previous findings in the literature (e.g., Berger 
and Hannan, 1998). The existence and generosity of a deposit insurance system seems to be 
associated with lower bank efficiency, however. We also find that greater government 
ownership of the banking industry is associated with lower bank efficiency. Large banks, 
moreover, tend to have higher efficiency. In addition, we find that a better institutional 
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environment in terms of laws and regulations exerts significant impact on bank operating 
efficiency. 
Our paper contributes in several important respects to the literature. First, the paper 
adds to the bank efficiency literature (as surveyed by Berger and Humphrey, 1997, and 
Berger, 2007) by providing comprehensive evidence on the relationship between regulation 
and supervision and efficiency using a large sample of banks covering 72 countries over the 
past decade. We also explore the effect of regulatory and supervisory changes on the changes 
in bank efficiency. Moreover, we conduct an instrumental variable (IV) analysis to address 
the possible endogeneity issue concerning the bank efficiency and regulatory schemes. 
Second, the paper contributes to the growing literature on international bank regulation and 
supervision (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2004; Barth et al., 2006; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Houston et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009) by 
examining the effects of bank regulation and supervision on bank operating efficiency. The 
efficiency measure can provide more comprehensive information about bank operation than 
does traditional financial ratio analysis because it summarizes performance in a single statistic 
that controls for differences among banks using a sophisticated multidimensional framework 
(Berger et al., 1997). The results, coupled with those from other related studies, may help 
countries in deciding upon appropriate regulatory reforms. Third, the paper adds to the 
literature on bank competition and performance (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1998; Berger et al., 
2004; Barth et al., 2009). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on 
the effect of bank regulations, supervisions, and market monitoring on bank efficiency. 
Section 3 presents our measures of bank efficiency, bank regulation and supervision, and 
market monitoring variables. It also discusses our data sources and summary statistics for our 
variables. Section 4 presents our empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 5 
provides some robustness tests as checks on our findings. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper with a discussion of the policy implications. 
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2. The relevant literature discussion  
 This section briefly summarizes relevant literature pertaining to the effect of bank 
regulation, supervision, and market monitoring on bank efficiency.  
 
2.1. Capital regulation and bank efficiency 
Capital regulation is considered to affect bank performance insofar as it specifies the 
required amount of capital that bank owners must have at risk. If bank owners are required to 
have more capital at risk, the upside gains that they would enjoy from greater risk taking 
would be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital (Barth et al., 2006). 
Therefore, official capital adequacy regulations are believed to play a crucial role in aligning 
the incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors, which results in more 
careful lending and better bank performance (Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Kaufman, 1991; 
Barth et al., 2006). However, this belief seems to be based on the public interest view and 
tends to ignore possible regulatory costs in the form of a higher barrier to entry and greater 
rent extraction by governments that result from higher capital requirements (Barth et al., 
2006).  In addition, adherents of a private interest view tend to oppose stringent regulations 
unless it can be shown that the benefits exceed the costs, and there is little hope of finding an 
alternative solution to adverse incentive problems. Thus, they generally would oppose 
reliance on stringent capital regulation given these mixed views about the outcome of a 
higher capital requirement. These arguments lead one to suspect that more stringent capital 
regulations lead to an efficiency loss in banking.  
 
2.2. Activity Restrictiveness and bank efficiency 
 As summarized in Barth et al. (2006), there are different views on the effects of activity 
restrictions. On the one hand, regulatory restrictions on bank activities can limit the 
exploitation of economies of scope and scale in gathering and processing information about 
firms, building reputational capital and providing various types of services to customers 
(Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wilcox, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007). By limiting a bank‘s 
activities, regulatory restrictions could also impede its ability to diversify income streams and 
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reduce the franchise value of a bank, which might limit the incentive for efficient behavior 
(Barth et al., 2006). Moreover, the private interest view would generally argue that the 
restrictions can be structured so as to give discretion to the regulators, and thus their 
bargaining power for rent seeking (Djankov et al., 2002). These arguments seem to imply a 
negative relationship between activity restrictiveness and bank efficiency. On the other hand, 
board financial activities might intensify moral hazard problems and provide more 
opportunities for banks to increase risk taking (Boyd, Chang and Smith, 1998). Moreover, 
broad financial activities may lead to the formation of extremely large and complex entities 
that are extraordinarily difficult to monitor and ―too big to discipline‖ (Laeven and Levine, 
2007; Barth et al., 2006). Therefore, the overall effect of activity restrictions on bank 
efficiency is an empirical question that we will explore in this study. 
 
2.3. Official supervisory power, its independence and bank efficiency 
As argued in Beck et al. (2006), the public interest view argues that bank supervisors 
have the incentives and expertise to overcome market failures due to imperfect information. 
Therefore, a powerful supervisory agency that directly monitors and disciplines banks can 
enhance the corporate governance of banks and boost bank efficiency. In this regard, 
supervisory power is expected to be positively associated with bank efficiency However, the 
private interest view argues that powerful regulators/supervisors will not focus on 
overcoming market failures; rather, they will focus on promoting their private interests. As 
Beck et al. (2006) point out, if bank supervisory agencies have the power to discipline 
non-compliant banks, the supervisors may use this power to induce or force banks to allocate 
credit so as to generate private or political benefits. In this regard, supervisor power might be 
negatively associated with bank efficiency.  
Supervisory independence also plays a crucial role in the formation of a well 
functioning banking system. As Barth et al. (2006) point out, supervisory independence 
enables the supervisors to be insulated from, or able to resist, pressure and influence to 
modify supervisory practices in order to cater to narrow political or business interests. In 
other words, supervisory independence allows bank supervisors to monitor the financial 
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condition of banks in a strictly professional and consistent manner. Moreover, supervisory 
independence allows supervisors to elicit the banks‘ views, including constructive criticism, 
of the guidance and advice they give to banks. Both the public interest and private views of 
regulation point to the need for independent regulatory agencies to improve bank efficiency. 
Despite the importance, very little is known about the relationship between supervision 
independence and bank performance. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis 
of this important issue in the following sections. In addition, we explore the interplay effect 
between supervisory power and supervisory independence to assess whether independent 
supervisors make better use of supervisory power in enhancing bank efficiency. 
 
2.4. Market monitoring and bank efficiency 
It is argued that bank supervisory policies should focus on strengthening the ability and 
incentives of private investors to overcome information barriers so that they can exert 
effective monitoring and governance over banks (Beck et al., 2006). Many economists over 
the years have advocated greater reliance on the private sector and expressed misgivings over 
the heavy emphasis placed on official supervision of banks. One important reason for this 
concern is that supervisors do not have an ownership stake in banks, which might generate 
different incentives than private creditors when it comes to monitoring and disciplining banks 
(Barth et al., 2006). Furthermore, the private interest view of regulation holds that banks will 
pressure politicians to unduly influence regulators/supervisors to take actions that mainly 
serve the special interests of the banks. Consequently, placing a greater reliance on market 
discipline to promote better functioning banks is important. In line with these arguments, 
Barth et al. (2006) document that supervisory agencies in many countries compel banks to 
produce reliable, comprehensive and consolidated information on the full range of bank 
activities and risk management procedures and hold the bank management legally 
accountable for accurate information disclosure. Nevertheless, great cross-country variation 
remains in the supervisory schemes empowering private monitoring. We will explore the 
effect of these supervisory schemes on bank efficiency in our following analysis. 
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3. Sample and Variables 
3.1. The Sample 
 The dataset used in this study is compiled from two main sources:  
(1) The BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings. This 
database has comprehensive coverage of banks in a large number of countries and accounts for 
over 90% of all banking assets in each country. The information for each bank consists of 
detailed balance sheet and income statement data, with up to 200 items and 36 pre-calculated 
financial ratios. 
(2) The Barth et al. (2004, 2006 and 2008) datasets on bank regulation, supervision and 
monitoring covering more than 100 countries. Their most comprehensive database is compiled 
from the answers provided by the official regulatory and supervisory authorities to three 
world-wide surveys on bank regulation and supervision.  
In this study, we match the bank-level information with the bank regulation measures to 
explore the link between bank regulation, supervision and monitoring and bank efficiency. 
Since the regulation data span nearly a decade, we focus on the time period 1999-2007.  
Specifically, the values of regulatory variables for the period of 1999 to 2001 are taken from 
the first survey for 1999. The values of regulatory variables for the period of 2002 to 2004 are 
taken from the second survey that assesses the state of regulation as of 2002. The regulatory 
measures for the period of 2005 to 2007 are taken from the third survey for 2005/20061. 
Accordingly, we calculate the average bank efficiency scores across these same three periods, 
respectively. Also, the inputs/outputs data used in estimating bank efficiency scores as well as 
the independent variables are based on the corresponding three-year averages. 
One advantage of using data averaged over the three-year period is that we smooth 
variables that vary over time (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). Furthermore, due to the incomplete 
overlap among the three datasets and missing firm-level and banking-sector variables, the final 
sample used in our study contains an unbalanced panel of 4,053 banks (8,115 bank-period 
                                                 
1 We tried some alternative ways to assign values, such as moving all the thresholds one year before or one year 
later and found the results to be quite robust. Another way was to try a longer time period but consistent results 
were obtained in this case as well. 
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observations) in 72 countries over the time period 1999-2007. The list of the countries can be 
found in table 3.  
      In addition to the three datasets mentioned above, we rely on two other data sources, the 
World Development Indicator (WDI, 2004) and the World Governance Indicator compiled by 
Kaufmann et al. (2006). Variables from these datasets are used to control for macroeconomic 
and institutional factors that might affect the overall level of bank efficiency in a country. 
Tables 1 and 2 identify the data sources and provide brief descriptions and summary statistics 
for the key variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
3.2. Bank Efficiency 
 Our measures of bank efficiency are obtained using a non-parametric method, namely 
data envelope analysis (DEA)2. The envelopment of data for the entire sample of banks using 
this approach enables one to identify the best practice banks that form the non-parametric 
efficient frontier. The advantage of a non-parametric technique like DEA relative to 
parametric techniques, such as the stochastic frontier or production function approaches, is 
that the latter require one to assume a particular functional form, thereby imposing a specific 
structure on the shape of the efficient frontier. This means that the deviations in efficiency 
measures between individual banks and the best practice banks on the efficient frontier will 
be dependent on how accurately the chosen functional form captures the true relationship. As 
DEA is non-parametric and envelops the multiple inputs/outputs data of the sample banks, 
the derived efficiency measures do not suffer from this problem of functional form 
dependency (e.g., see Drake et al., 2006).  
Regarding the model specification, we use the standard financial intermediation approach 
to evaluate the relative efficiency of banks. This approach was originally developed by Sealey 
and Lindeley (1977) and posits that total loans and securities are outputs, whereas deposits 
along with labor and physical capital are inputs3. This approach to modeling financial 
                                                 
2 The non-parametric efficiency approach was originally developed by Farrell (1957) and subsequently has 
been widely used in the bank efficiency literature (please see section 4 for detailed discussion). 
 
3 We have also used the profit approach to measure bank operation efficiency, along the lines of Drake et al. 
(2006), and find the results to be robust.  
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intermediation has been widely adopted and used in the literature. Following more recent 
applications (e.g., Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2004; Drake, Hall and Simper, 2006), we 
posit an intermediation model that has four inputs and three outputs. The three basic inputs (Xi) 
are: X1 (total deposits + total money market funds + total other funding); X2 (personnel 
expenses-labor input); and X3 (total fixed assets - physical input). We also include another 
input X4 (loan loss provisions) to capture the risk/potential costs in making loan decisions. As 
Drake et al. (2006) point out, it has long been argued in the literature that the incorporation of 
risk/loan quality is vitally important in studies of bank efficiency. More specifically, Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003) argue that risk should be captured in an efficiency analysis through the 
inclusion of loan loss provisions, which could be viewed as a cost or an input. As stated by 
them, ‗‗…loan loss provisions required to build up loan loss reserves should be considered and 
treated as a cost. A cost that will be faced with certainty over time but that is uncertain as to 
when it will materialize.‘‘ (p. 181). Based on these considerations, we include loan loss 
provisions as a fourth input in our model. 
With respect to the three outputs (Yi), they are: Y1 (total customer loans + total other 
lending); Y2 (total other earning assets— other interest generating or fee yielding assets such 
as bonds and investment securities); and Y3 (other, non-interest, income). The inclusion of the 
latter output is included so as not to penalize those banks with a relatively large share of 
non-traditional bank activities. The efficiency scores are obtained from these inputs and 
outputs using the DEA method described in detail in section 4. 
 
3.3 Activity Restrictiveness 
This variable indicates whether bank activities in (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing 
in securities, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, 
and (c) real estate investment, development, and management  are (1) Unrestricted, (2) 
Permitted, (3) Restricted, or (4) Prohibited. The aggregate indicator therefore ranges from four 
to sixteen with higher values indicating greater activity restrictiveness. 
 
3.4. Capital Stringency  
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This variable indicates whether the capital requirement incorporates certain risk elements 
and deducts certain market value losses when capital adequacy is determined. Specifically, it is 
an indicator based on a summation of the answers to the following questions (Yes=1, No=0): 1. 
Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines? 
2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's credit risk? 3. Does the 
minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 4. Before minimum capital adequacy is 
determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital: a) Market 
value of loan losses not realized in accounting books; b) Unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios? c) Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Higher values of this variable indicate 
greater stringency. 
 
3.5. Supervision 
 We use three variables to measure the strength, independence and experience of the bank 
supervisor. These are as follows: 
(1) The variable Official Supervisory Power is constructed from 14 dummy variables that 
indicate whether bank supervisors can take specific actions against bank management, bank 
owners, and bank auditors both in normal times and times of distress. This includes 
information on whether the supervisory agency can force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure, suspend dividends, stop bonuses, halt management fees, force banks 
to constitute provisions against actual or potential losses as determined by the supervisory 
agency, supersede the legal rights of shareholders, remove and replace managers and directors, 
obtain information from external auditors, and take legal action against auditors for negligence. 
(The exact definition and construction of Official Supervisory Power is provided in the data 
appendix.) The first principal component indicator of these variables is used, with higher 
values indicating broader and greater authority for bank supervisors.   
(2) The variable Supervisory Independence is an aggregate indicator which measures the 
degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally 
protected from the banking industry. Specifically, the variable is constructed based on the 
following three questions.  First, are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable to a) 
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Prime Minister, b) the Finance Minister or other cabinet level official, or c) a legislative body, 
such as parliament of congress? The indicator equals one if the supervisory bodies are 
responsible to a legislative body and zero otherwise.  Second, are the supervisors legally liable 
for their actions (i.e., if a supervisor takes actions against a bank, can the supervisor be sued)? 
The variable equals one if the supervisors are not legally liable for their actions, and zero 
otherwise.  Third, does the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) have a fixed 
term and, if so, how long? The index equals one if the fixed term is equal or greater than four 
years, and zero otherwise. The aggregate indicator may therefore vary between 0 and 3, with a 
higher number indicating more independent supervisory agencies. 
(3) The variable Supervisor Tenure measures the average tenure of a professional bank 
supervisor. It indicates the experience of the current bank supervisors. 
 
3.6. Monitoring 
We use four variables to measure the degree of monitoring by external auditors and the 
public (through information disclosure). First, the variable Certified Audit Required is an index 
which measures whether an external audit by licensed auditors is a compulsory obligation for 
banks. Second, the variable Strength of External Audit measures the effectiveness of external 
audits of banks. It is an indicator based on answers to the following questions (Yes=1, No=0): 1. 
Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 2. Are specific requirements for the 
extent or nature of the audit spelled out? 3. Are auditors licensed or certified? 4. Do supervisors 
get a copy of the auditor's report? 5. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with 
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 6. Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement 
of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 7. Can 
supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Higher values of the 
indicator indicate that more information is provided by the external audit. Third, the variable 
Bank Accounting is an index which measures whether the income statement includes accrued 
or unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans and whether banks are required to 
produce consolidated financial statements. Higher values indicate more informative bank 
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financial statements. Better information disclosure can facilitate the monitoring of banks by 
both the auditor and the public. And fourth, the variable Deposit Insurance Coverage is the 
ratio of deposit insurance coverage to deposits per capita. Barth et al. (2006) point out that 
deposit insurance intensifies the moral hazard problem in banking because depositors do not 
face the risk of losses, which diminishes the incentive to and effort at monitoring bank 
activities. Hence, higher values of this index indicate less private monitoring. 
 
3.7. Other controls 
  We also control for banking sector concentration. Specifically, we use the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares (deposits) 
of each individual bank in the individual countries. The bank level data are from the 
BankScope database. The (normalized) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ranges from 0 to 1, with a 
higher value indicating greater monopoly power4. We expect greater banking concentration to 
be negatively associated with bank efficiency. This is because a concentrated banking market 
potentially allows a few powerful banks to dominate and thereby stymie competition with 
deleterious effect on efficiency (e.g., Berger et al., 2004; Demirgu-Kunt et al., 2004). More 
concentrated power allows bank managers to relax their efforts on improving performance, 
whereas the pressure of a competitive market provides incentives to managers to perform 
better and also provides information for the use of appropriate incentive schemes (e.g., 
Schaferstein, 1988; Berger and Hannan, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2000).  
In addition, we control for banking-sector state ownership. It is well known that state 
ownership of firms is usually associated with lower firm efficiency because the government 
tends to pursue non-profit driven goals, such as supporting employment and maintaining 
social stability (e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001). La Porta et al. (2002) argue that 
state-owned banks5 are controlled by politicians who use the banks to maximize their own 
political and personal objectives, such as providing jobs for political supporters and bailing out 
                                                 
4 Other concentration measures such as the top 5 bank asset/deposit concentration ratios yield very similar 
results. 
5 According to La Porta et al. (2002), state ownership of banks is common in countries other than the United 
States.  Based on the 10 largest banks in 92 countries, they document that 42% of bank assets in these countries 
are controlled by the state-owned banks.  
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poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We therefore include a variable to measure 
the ownership structure of the banking industry. In particular, the variable State Owned Bank is 
included and is the fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more owned 
by the government.  
 We control for bank size to capture the potential size effect on bank lending behavior 
(e.g., Berger et al., 2005).The variable Bank Size equals the logarithm of total bank assets in 
millions of U.S. dollars. We also control for Bank Equity, which is the ratio of the book value 
of equity to total assets.  
3.9. Country Controls 
    The empirical analysis also includes several country-level variables to control for 
differences in economic development and institutions across countries. We include GDP per 
capita to capture the economic development of a region/country. Also, we include the natural 
logarithm of GDP to capture the size of an economy and we control for inflation in an economy. 
Lastly, we include a series of political and institutional quality indexes as a check on the 
robustness of the results. These are the World Governance Indexes (Kaufmann et al., 2006), 
which are constructed from 276 individual variables taken from 31 different sources produced 
by 25 different organizations. The indexes measure different dimensions of governance, which 
include Government effectiveness, Political stability, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Voice 
and accountability, and Control of Corruption. The detailed definition can be found in table 1. 
Higher values of the indexes indicate higher quality institutions. We expect that banks tend to 
be more efficient in more developed countries and in countries with higher quality institutions. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
We apply a widely used non-parametric method, data envelopment analysis (DEA), to 
obtain bank efficiency scores and then perform second-stage regressions to examine the 
relationship between bank regulation, supervision and monitoring and bank efficiency. There 
are four major advantages of applying this approach in our context.  
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First, DEA is a nonparametric approach and does not impose an assumption about a 
specific production functional form. It is an extension of the earlier nonparametric analysis of 
productivity by Afriat (1972) and Varian (1984) to allow individual banks to deviate from their 
profit maximization frontier and therefore to exhibit some degree of inefficiency (Banker and 
Maindiratta, 1988). In other words, the DEA approach measures a bank‘s performance relative 
to a 'best practice' frontier derived from its peer group (Farrell, 1957). Such a measure is 
superior to traditional techniques, such as a financial ratio analysis because it summarizes 
performance in a single statistic that controls for differences among banks using a sophisticated 
multidimensional framework. This type of analysis can be used to assist a bank in evaluating 
whether it is performing better or worse than its peer group in terms of technology, scale, cost 
minimization and revenue maximization and thus in directing management efforts to the areas 
that need the most improvement (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2005). The DEA approach, moreover, 
is a standard nonparametric estimation method that has been well-established in the 
econometrics literature (e.g., see Banker and Maindiratta, 1988, Färe and Grosskopf, 1995, 
Chambers et al., 1998, Kuosmanen et al., 2007, Simar and Wilson, 2007).  Indeed, a special 
issue of Journal of Econometrics (Lewin and Lovell 1990, eds.) has been devoted to the 
development and analysis of DEA. Furthermore, Banker and Natarajan (2008) show that a 
two-stage DEA-based approach comprising a DEA model followed by a maximum likelihood 
estimation yields a consistent estimator that performs at least as good as parametric methods in 
the estimation of the impact of the contextual variables on the efficiency scores. The DEA 
method has also been employed widely in top economics journals (e.g., Färe et al., 1994, Ray 
and Desli, 1997, and Kumar and Russell, 2002).  In addition, it has been increasingly applied 
in the finance literature, including the banking and financial institution efficiency literature 
(e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1997, Seiford and Zhu, 1999, Wheelock and Wilson, 1995 and 
2000, Copper et al., 2004, Cummins and Ruio-Misas, 2006). Second, DEA focuses on 
individual observations rather than on the population average, as compared with regression 
analysis. According to Banker and Natarajan (2008), the simulation results indicate that 
DEA-based procedures perform better than parametric methods in the estimation of an 
individual decision-making unit (individual bank in our case) productivity.  Third, DEA 
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compares bank performance to the revealed best-practice frontier, rather than on the 
central-tendency properties of the frontier. 
In the first-stage estimation, the DEA methodology computes an operational efficiency 
score for each bank in the sample. The second-stage estimation then examines the determinants 
of the efficiency scores.  
The operational efficiency score for a bank is estimated as the fraction of actual inputs 
that is required for the bank to be located on the efficient frontier to produce the same level of 
output.  Suppose the sample size is n and there are m inputs and s outputs for each bank.  
Denote xk = (x1k , x2k , …, xmk) as a m1 vector of inputs for bank k, X=(x1, x2, …, xn) as a m  
n matrix of inputs, yk =(y1k , y2k , …, ysk) as a s1 vector of outputs for bank k, and Y=(y1, 
y2, …, yn) as a sn matrix of outputs, respectively.  The variable returns to scale DEA model 
can be expressed with the following n linear programming problems for each bank k (k=1, 
2,…n): 
Max(k 1 | xk , yk, X,Y)=Max(k 1 | k yk  Yk , Xk  xk , k0, I1k=1)      (1) 
where I1 denotes an n1 vector of ones, k denotes a scalar parameter, and k =(1k , 2k , …, 
nk) denotes a n1 non-negative vector of parameters. 
The DEA model in (1) has an intuitive interpretation. For each bank k, a virtual output 
Yk is constructed as a weighted output of all the banks by choosing some nonnegative 
weights k0, I1‘k=1. It then seeks to expand the virtual output Yk as much as possible, 
subject to the inputs constraint of bank k: Xk  xk. The virtual output Yk is then compared 
with the actual output yk of bank k. If the maximized virtual output Yk is above the actual 
output of bank k by a scalar factor of k>1, then the bank k is inefficient. Otherwise, the bank 
k is located at the efficient frontier since k=1.  
The input-oriented efficiency score is defined as ek=1/k (0 ek1) for bank k. Under the 
DEA method, a bank with an efficiency score of unity (100%) is located on the efficient 
frontier in the sense that its outputs cannot be further expanded without increasing its inputs.  
A bank with an efficiency score below 100% is relatively inefficient, suggesting that a bank 
can attain its current output level with fewer inputs.  As discussed in Section 3.2 above, in the 
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first-stage estimation, we have four inputs and three outputs to estimate efficiency scores for 
each bank in the sample based on model (1). 
 
In the second stage, we estimate the following equation to identify the determinants of 
the banking efficiency score ek : 
ek = Xk + uk                (2) 
where ek is the efficiency score for bank k. Xk is a vector of explanatory variables including a 
constant term, which represent bank regulation, supervision and monitoring as well as other 
control variables, such as bank industry characteristics and macroeconomic environment, as 
discussed in Section 3. uk is an error term with a standard error of u. Since efficiency scores 
ek are truncated below from zero and above from unity, uk is an error term with 
double-truncation. As a result, Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that the truncated regression 
estimation permits valid inference. We apply the standard maximum likelihood estimation 
with heteroskedasticity robust standards errors clustered by countries to allow for possible 
cross-section correlations. When clustering the standard errors by country, observations are 
not restricted to be independent within countries; rather, observations are required to be 
independent across countries (Beck et al., 2006). We therefore follow them with clustering the 
standard errors by country6. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Main results 
 Table 3 summarizes the bank efficiency scores. The second and third columns give 
un-weighted and weighted mean (by total loans) of individual bank efficiency measures within 
each country, respectively. The table covers a sample of 72 countries at different income levels. 
More developed countries usually have higher bank efficiency measures. For example, 
developed countries such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States, 
generally have measures higher than 0.8 or even 0.9, while middle-income countries such as 
Hungary, Russia, and Malaysia tend to have efficiency scores close to the mean level. Less 
                                                 
6 The empirical results will be highly robust and even more significant without the country clustering effect. 
 19 
developed countries such as Sudan, Senegal, and Nigeria tend to have measures much lower 
than the mean level. Column 3 presents the standard deviation of the efficiency measures 
within each country. As shown, the magnitude of the standard deviations of the measures for 
most countries is small relative to its mean, suggesting that within each country, there is not 
substantial variation of bank efficiency. A country‘s specific institutional and regulatory 
framework may be the major determinants of its banking firms‘ efficiency. Finally, columns 4 
and 5 present lower and upper bounds of the efficiency measures based on a bootstrapping 
method at a confidence level of 95%.  
[Tables 3 here] 
 We also checked the correlations among the bank regulation, supervision and other 
control variables and found that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Most of the 
correlation coefficients are below 0.3, which makes us comfortable with simultaneously 
including these variables in the estimated models. The correlation matrix for the variables is 
presented in Table 4.  
[Tables 4 here] 
 Table 5 presents our main regression results. The dependent variable is the DEA bank 
efficiency measure or score based on truncated ML estimation. The first column summarizes 
the regression of the efficiency score on regulatory variables, such as activity restrictiveness, 
overall capital stringency, and a number of control variables, such as the Herfindal Index (HHI), 
government ownership of banks, bank size, bank equity (ratio), and a country‘s GDP and 
inflation. It is clear that more stringent bank activity restrictions are associated with less bank 
efficiency, as indicated by its negative and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient. A one 
standard deviation increase in activities restrictiveness decreases bank efficiency by 3.4%. The 
overall capital stringency is positive and marginally significantly (at the 10% level) related to 
bank efficiency. This result suggests the potential offsetting effects of more stringent capital 
regulation on bank efficiency. Stringent capital regulation may help reduce bank risk, but at the 
expense of some efficiency loss. Overall, the effect is positive and marginally significant. 
As for the control variables, less bank competition, as measured by the HHI, is indeed 
negatively and significantly related to bank efficiency. The government ownership of banks is 
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also negatively related to bank efficiency, as indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient. A 10% increase in government ownership of the banking sector reduces bank 
efficiency by 3%. These results support our earlier arguments that bank competition enhances 
bank efficiency while government ownership may distort bank operations and hence reduce 
bank efficiency. We also find that large banks tend to have higher bank efficiency scores. This 
may be due to scale/scope economies in banking. A higher equity to asset ratio is also 
positively associated with bank efficiency. This suggests that well-capitalized banks may also 
have higher efficiency. A country‘s inflation is negatively associated with bank efficiency, 
suggesting that a lower inflationary environment is more conducive to efficient bank 
operations. A more developed country, as measured by a higher GDP per capita, tends to have 
more efficient banking. Finally, a larger market, as measured by a larger GDP level, is also 
associated with more efficient banks.  
 Columns 2 and 3 present regressions of bank efficiency measures with official 
supervisory power and its independency as main regulatory variables. In both columns 2 and 3, 
we find that official supervisory power is not significant in explaining bank efficiency. In 
contrast, the average tenure of supervisors and the independence of the supervisory authority 
are both statistically and positively significant. This result suggests that strengthening 
supervisory power itself does not necessarily lead to higher bank efficiency. Instead, increasing 
the independence of the authority with supervisory power helps enhance bank efficiency. In 
addition, in column 3, the interaction term of official supervisory power and supervisory 
independence is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that 
strengthening supervisory power is effective in improving in bank efficiency in countries with 
more independent regulators/supervisors. To better understand the economic significance of 
our findings, consider the set of coefficients reported under column (3) of Table 5. Those 
estimates imply that one-standard deviation increase in supervisory power increases operating 
efficiency of banks in countries with the most independent regulators by 5.5% more than a 
similar increase in supervisory power for banks in countries with the least independent 
regulators. Finally, the control variables all show similar coefficients as in the regression in 
Column 1. 
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 Column 4 of Table 5 summarizes the regression results with variables related to market 
monitoring, the third pillar of Basel II. In particular, we find that the strength of external audit, 
certified audit required, and bank accounting informativeness, are all positively and 
statistically significant in explaining bank efficiency. This suggests that the market monitoring 
mechanisms of Basel II help to enhance bank efficiency. In addition to other control variables 
used in first three regressions, in column 4, we also report the coefficient of deposit insurance 
coverage/deposits per capita on bank efficiency to be negative and highly significant. This 
result suggests that the existence and generosity of deposit insurance may induce more adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems associated with it and hence producing a negative effect 
on bank efficiency (Barth et al., 2006).  
 Columns 5 presents the overall results with a more complete set of regulatory variables, 
including those for all three pillars of Basel II. We find that the major regulatory variables 
retain their signs and significance as before, suggesting the main predictions of our model are 
quite robust when including these additional variables. The control variables also yield similar 
effects on bank efficiency as in previous regressions. Finally, the pseudo R2 are all above 0.3, 
suggesting good explanatory power of our regressions. 
 
5.2. Robust checks: Instrumental Variables 
 In this section, we provide some robustness checks of our main results indicating that the 
type of regulatory environment matters for bank efficiency. In particular, we address a possible 
endogeneity problem that may be associated with our previous regressions and also try to 
control for more country-specific institutional variables.  
 A potential endogeneity problem could exist insofar as the main results in Table 5 may be 
due to reverse causality. A more efficient bank may influence regulatory policies in the 
direction of being more accommodative to the growth and development of the bank. In other 
words, the regulatory framework may be endogenous to the structure of the banking system in 
each country. To address this concern, we use an Instrument Variable (IV) approach. 
Following previous studies (Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2009), we select the instrumental 
variables based on the theoretical and empirical work in the law, institutions, and finance 
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literature (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003; Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; La Portal et al., 1998 and 1999). From the law and finance perspective, La 
Portal et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2003) show that historically determined differences in legal 
traditions help explain international financial institutions today. Furthermore, legal origin can 
be thought of as ―exogenous‖ because it was imposed by colonial power in many emerging 
countries (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; La Porta et al., 1999). It is not very likely that legal 
origin itself would have a direct impact on banking performance today. Instead, it may exert an 
indirect impact through the channels of various institutions and regulations. We also take into 
account the endowment theory, which focuses on the roles of geography and the disease 
environment in shaping the political and financial institutional development. Studies (e.g., 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck, Dimirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003) find strong evidence that 
geographical endowment has substantial impacts on the formation of long-lasting institutions 
that shape financial development. Based on the above discussion, we use legal origin (English, 
French), latitude as instrumental variables for the bank regulatory variables in that country. We 
also include the ethnic fractionalization as an instrumental variable because it has been found 
that economies with greater ethnic diversity tend to choose institutions that facilitate 
expropriation (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Finally, we follow Beck et al. (2006) and include 
the percentage of years that the country has been independent since 1776 as an additional 
instrumental variable because countries that gained their independence earlier had more 
opportunity to modify colonial institutions and adopt policies more conducive to economic 
development.. 
Following the literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2006), we conduct two tests to assess the 
appropriateness of the instruments. First, we employ overidentifying tests, which assess 
whether the instrumental variables are associated with the dependent variable beyond their 
effects through media-sector ownership and structure or the other explanatory variables. We 
refer to this analysis as the ―Overidentifying Test‖ and report the p-value of the test of the 
overidentifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies a failure to reject the 
validity of the instruments. As can be seen from Table 6, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid in all model specifications, suggesting that these instruments only 
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exert an impact on bank efficiency through their effect on the bank regulation and supervision 
measures. In addition, we conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variables in the 
first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that the instruments do not explain 
cross-sectional differences in banking regulation measures. We reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% confidence level in all model specifications7.  
 Our main empirical results are robust to the IV regression analysis. In Table 6, the 
coefficients of main regulatory variables, the capital requirement, supervisory power and 
supervisory independence, and market monitoring, are all statistically significant and their 
signs are the same as in the regressions in Table 5.  Furthermore, the IV coefficients are larger 
than the OLS coefficients, indicating the existence of potential measurement error, which 
would tend to ―attenuate‖ the coefficient estimates toward zero (Barth et al., 2009). Similar 
results also obtain for the control variables. Taken altogether, the results for our IV estimations 
imply that our findings are robust to potential endogeneity concerns.  
 
5.3. Robust checks: Bank Regulation Changes 
  As Barth et al. (2008) point out, a large number of banking regulatory reforms have 
occurred in various countries over the past decade. Since these reforms arguably have had a 
meaningful effect on the regulatory environment, it is interesting to explore how international 
bank flows have responded to these regulatory changes. We follow Barth et al. (2008) to make 
comparisons on the bank regulatory environment in year 1999 (using Survey I) and year 2006 
(using Survey III). These comparisons are illustrated in Figures 1-6. 
[Figures 1 to 6 here] 
 Changes in activities restrictiveness are presented in Figure 1. A change in a positive 
direction indicates a move towards greater restrictiveness. As can be seen, most countries 
tightened restrictions during the past decade. The activities restrictiveness in many developing 
countries, such as Nicaragua, Kazakhstan, and Costa Rica, increased dramatically over this 
period. At the same time, restrictions have eased in such countries as Mauritius, Belgium, and 
                                                 
7 Similar to the claim in Beck et al. (2006), we are not claiming that these variables are the best instrumental 
variables. Instead, we hold that the instruments are reasonably exogenous and have decent explanatory power of 
bank regulation and supervision measures, as the literature points out. 
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Romania. Figure 2 highlights changes in capital regulations. As can be seen, most countries in 
our sample have undergone some change in capital regulations. A change in a positive 
direction indicates a move towards greater stringency. In our sample, the countries easing 
capital requirements are less numerous than those moving towards greater stringency.  More 
specifically, countries like Belgium, Jordan, Slovenia, and Argentina have eased capital 
regulations, whereas Ecuador, Tunisia, Uganda, Slovak and Nigeria have dramatically 
tightened capital regulations over the past decade. 
 Figure 3 shows changes in the strength of the external audit. In our sample, many 
countries have gone through some changes in the information disclosure requirements. As can 
be seen from Figure 3, the strength of the external audit has been improved in most countries. 
The improvements are more prominent in developing countries. Figure 4 shows the changes in 
the informativeness of bank accounting information, with many countries having undergone 
some reforms. Figure 5 shows the changes of Official Supervisory Power. As can be seen, most 
countries in our sample have moved to strengthen official supervision, or at least provide 
supervisors with more explicit power, most notably in countries such as Turkey, Ecuador, 
Nigeria and many other developing countries. Interestingly, countries like Australia, Botswana, 
Czech Republic, and the U.K. moved in the opposite direction. In fact, the U.K. authorities 
have established a working group to address concerns about excessive regulation and 
supervision (Barth et al., 2008). Overall, the figures show that many countries have followed 
the Basel II guidelines to strengthen capital regulations, to empower supervisory agencies to a 
greater degree, and to improve financial statement transparency (Barth et al., 2008). Finally, 
Figure 6 shows the changes of supervisory independence. As can be seen, about half of the 
countries have moved towards a more independent supervisory system and another half of the 
countries have moved towards a less independent supervisory system.  
 To examine the effects of regulatory changes on international bank flow changes, we use 
the first differencing estimation with three time periods (corresponding to the three surveys). 
Specifically, we examine the effect of the regulatory changes on the changes of the bank 
efficiency changes. The sample thus contains observations for at least two consecutive 
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observations and its size drops to between  4,053 and 4,090. The empirical results are 
presented in table 7. 
[Table 7 here] 
 As can be seen from the table, the empirical results are highly robust to our previous 
findings. We find that the changes in the gaps of activity restrictiveness, capital regulatory 
stringency, strength of external audit, certified audit requirement, bank accounting 
informativeness, supervisor tenure, and independence of supervisory authorities are positively 
associated with the changes in bank efficiency. We also find that the change of supervisory 
strength results in positive bank efficiency changes in countries with independent supervisory 
authorities. The control variables also yield similar results.  
 
5.4. Robustness Tests: More Macro controls 
 We now address the issue of potential omitted variables. In addition to regulatory and 
macro-economic variables, we include a series of macro-institutional indexes in our model to 
test the robustness of the results.  
 We include the World Governance Indexes complied by Kaufmann et al. (2006) to control 
for the effect of other country-specific institutional variables on bank efficiency. In particular, 
these indexes include a country‘s control of corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability, quality and regulation, rule of law, and voice and accountability. The detailed 
definition of the indexes is discussed in Section 3. Because some indexes are highly correlated 
with each other, we include the indexes individually in the models. The empirical results are 
consistent with our previous findings. All major explanatory variables and control variables 
maintain their sign and significance as before. The new control variables, the Kaufmann 
indexes, also show expected signs. In particular, we find that all indexes are positive and 
Quality of Regulation, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability have statistically significant 
effects on bank efficiency. This result suggests that a better institutional environment in terms 
of law and regulations is generally conducive to more efficient banking in the countries 
studied. 
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We also conduct some other robustness checks. For instance, recent development of the 
two-stage bootstrapping DEA (e.g., Simar and Wilson, 2007) introduces a random disturbance 
into the model. We test the robustness of the results using this new approach and find the 
results highly consistent. For brevity, the results are not reported but available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in assessing the appropriate 
regulatory reforms to mitigate, if not prevent, future banking crises. More generally, effort is 
being devoted to identifying the bank regulatory regime that works best to promote a 
well-functioning banking system. Such a system would be one that improves bank efficiency. 
In this regard, and building upon a recent world-wide survey on bank regulation across 152 
countries (Barth et al., 2008), we examine the important effects of bank regulation and 
supervision on bank operating efficiency. Based on an analysis of a sample with more than 
8,000 bank-year observations in 72 countries over the time period 1999-2007, we find bank 
regulation, supervision and market monitoring all exert significant impacts on bank efficiency. 
Regarding bank regulation, we find in particular that tighter bank activity restrictions exert 
negative impacts on bank efficiency while the greater capital regulation stringency exerts 
marginally positive effects on bank efficiency. The results imply there are potential tradeoffs 
between bank safety/soundness and efficiency. In addition, we find that a strengthening of 
official supervisory power, the second pillar of Basil II, is not significantly related to greater 
bank efficiency. However, greater independence of the supervisory authority tends to enhance 
bank efficiency. In addition, there is a strong interaction and positive effect of official 
supervisory power and supervisory independence on bank efficiency. This result is important 
as it suggests that independence of supervisory agencies from both politicians and banking 
firms is conducive to improved bank efficiency. It also suggests that putting the official 
supervisory power in the hands of independent supervisors might be helpful to improve the 
efficiency of the banking system. We also find supervisor experience is positively related to 
bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial 
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transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency. We find that an external auditor 
requirement, the strength of external auditor, and bank information disclosure are positively 
associated with bank operating efficiency while generous deposit insurance coverage is 
negatively associated with bank operating efficiency. These results suggest the positive role 
that can be played by the third pillar of Basel II in improving banking efficiency. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variables Definition Original Sources 
Financial intermediation 
model 
 
 
Outputs of Banks   
Total Loans Loans and total other lending (mil USD) BankScope 
 
Other Earning Assets 
 
Total other earning assets (mil USD) 
 
BankScope 
 
Other Operating Income 
 
Other operating income (mil USD) 
 
BankScope 
Inputs of Banks   
Total Deposits The sum of total deposits, total money market funding, and total other funding (mil USD) 
 
BankScope 
Labor Input Personnel expenses (mil USD) 
 
BankScope 
 
Capital Input 
 
 
Fixed assets (mil USD)  
 
BankScope 
Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Provisions and other provisions (mil USD) BankScope 
Other variables   
 
Bank Efficiency 
 
Technical efficiency of the bank with the range between 0 and 1 
 
Authors‘ calculation 
HHI 
 
To control for competition we use a Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared shares of 
bank deposits to total deposits within a given country, averaged over the period 2004 to 2006. 
 
BankScope 
 
Bank Size 
 
Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
BankScope 
Bank Equity The book value of equity divided by total assets times 100 BankScope 
Activities restrictions 
 
The extent to which banks may engage in (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and 
all aspects of the mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, and (c) real estate 
investment, development, and management. Unrestricted=1: full range of activities can be conducted 
directly in the bank; Permitted=2: full range of activates can be conducted, but some or all must be 
conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted=3: less than full range of activities can be conducted in the bank 
or subsidiaries; and Prohibited=4: the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. 
Higher values indicate greater restrictiveness 
Barth et al. (2006) 
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Overall capital stringency  
 
Whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses 
from capital adequacy is determined. Specifically, it is an indicator developed based on the following 
questions (Yes=1, No=0): 1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line 
with the Basle guidelines? 2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's 
credit risk? 3. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 4. Before minimum capital 
adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital: a) 
Market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books; b) Unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios? c) Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Higher values indicating greater stringency. 
 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Average tenure of supervisors The average number of years current supervisors have been appointed Barth et al. (2006) 
   
Strength of external audit 
The effectiveness of external audits of banks. It is an indicator developed based on the following 
questions (Yes=1, No=0) : 1. Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 2. Are specific 
requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? 3. Are auditors licensed or certified? 4. 
Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? 5. Does the supervisory agency have the right to 
meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 6. Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of 
bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 7. Can supervisors take 
legal action against external auditors for negligence? Higher values indicate better strength of 
external audit. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
 
Certified Audit Required 
 
Whether there is a compulsory external audit by a licensed or certified auditor. (Yes=1; No=0) 
Barth et al. (2006) 
State Owned Bank 
 
The fraction of the banking system's assets in the banks that are 50 percent or more owned by 
government. The data are compiled based on a survey of banking regulators in 150 countries in 2003. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Deposit insurance coverage / 
deposit per capita 
Ratio of deposit insurance coverage to deposits per capita 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. 
(2008) 
Bank Accounting Informative 
Whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal on performing and 
nonperforming loans and whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial statements. 
Higher value indicates more informative bank account. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Official Supervisory Power 
 
Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1.Does the supervisory agency have the right 
to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of 
bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take 
legal action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the supervisory authority force a bank to 
Barth et al. (2006) 
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change its internal organizational structure? 5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to 
distribute: a) Dividends? b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency legally 
declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 
9. Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some 
or all ownership rights-a problem bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency 
or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) Remove and 
replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
 
Supervisory Independence 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally 
protected from the banking industry. The indicator is constructed based on the following three 
questions. 1. Are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable to a) Prime Minister, b) the 
Finance Minister or other cabinet level official, c) a legislative body, such as parliament of congress?  
2.  Are the supervisors legally liable for their actions (i.e. if a supervisor takes actions against a 
bank, the supervisor cannot be sued)?  3. Does the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) have a fixed term and how long? (=1 if the term>=4). Higher value means a more 
independent supervisory agency. 
Barth et al. (2006) 
Inflation  3-year average percentage inflation, GDP deflator.  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP per Capita Logarithm of 3-year average gross domestic product per capita. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP Natural logarithm of 3-year average gross domestic product. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Voice and Accountability 
The indicator measures the extent to which a country‘s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. The 
value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values mean greater political rights. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
Government Effectiveness 
 
The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government‘s commitment to such policies. The value of year 2005 is used 
in this study. Higher values mean higher quality of public and civil service. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
Rule of Law 
The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  The value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values mean 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
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stronger law and order. 
Political Stability 
 
The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism. The 
value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values mean more stable political environment. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
Quality of Regulation 
The indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote market competition and private-sector development. The value 
of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values mean higher quality of regulation. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
Control of Corruption 
 
The indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ―capture‖ of the state by elites and private interests. 
The value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values indicate better control of corruption. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) 
Table 2: Summary statistics for variables 
Variable Mean Median SD 
No. of 
observations 
Panel A: Bank level data     
Outputs of banks     
Total loans 5.68  5.59  2.36  8143 
Other earning assets 5.24  5.18  2.36  8143 
Other operating incomes 1.85  1.35  1.80  8143 
Inputs of banks     
Total deposit 6.16  6.07  2.35  8143 
Labor input 2.50  2.14  1.73  8143 
Capital input 2.43  2.09  1.83  8143 
Loan loss provisions 1.55  1.05  1.61  8143 
Bank characteristics     
Bank size 6.33  6.24  2.26  8143 
Bank equity 13.26  10.08  9.80  8143 
     
Panel B: Banking Sector Variables    
     Activities restrictions 6.71  6 1.88  8143 
Overall capital stringency  4.55  5 1.47  8115 
  Average tenure of supervisors  6.45  7 4.92  8143 
Independence of Supervisory 
Authority - Overall 1.80  2 0.81  8069 
     Official Supervisory 
Power  11.01  12 2.52  8143 
     Strength of external audit 5.89  6 0.92  8143 
Certified Audit Required 0.96  1 0.20  8143 
      Bank accounting 
informative 3.46  4 0.76  8143 
Deposit insurance coverage/ 
deposit per capita 5.10  2.43  8.46  8143 
State Owned Bank 18.67  11.56  20.53  8143 
     
Panel C: Other Control Variables    
HHI 0.15  0.11  0.16  8143 
Inflation 5.86  3.28  7.19  8143 
Log GDP per capita 9.21  9.13  1.35  8143 
Log GDP 26.85  26.85  2.05  8143 
Control of Corruption 0.54  0.41  1.12  8143 
Government Effectiveness 0.69  0.62  1.02  8143 
Political Stability 0.12  0.43  0.83  8143 
Quality of Regulation 0.60  0.85  0.95  8143 
Rule of Law 0.48  0.50  1.14  8143 
Voice and Accountability 0.48  0.91  0.94  8143 
Note: The sample consists of 4,053 banks in 72 countries for a 3-period panel. 
Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 3: Bank efficiency scores for countries 
Country  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
95% C. I. 
lower bound 
95% C. I. 
upper bound 
Algeria 0.58  0.24  0.49  0.78  
Argentina 0.66  0.28  0.45  0.76  
Armenia 0.34  0.25  0.25  0.44  
Australia 0.81  0.05  0.78  0.84  
Austria 0.81  0.21  0.64  0.92  
Azerbaijan 0.49  0.26  0.25  0.80  
Belgium 0.92  0.17  0.66  0.95  
Bolivia 0.59  0.26  0.46  0.69  
Botswana 0.69  0.23  0.49  0.76  
Brazil 0.75  0.22  0.68  0.82  
Bulgaria 0.57  0.28  0.49  0.72  
Burkina Faso 0.47  0.27  0.38  0.57  
Canada 0.88  0.15  0.83  0.91  
Chile 0.71  0.23  0.58  0.86  
Colombia 0.62  0.21  0.48  0.80  
Costa Rica 0.59  0.26  0.39  0.74  
Croatia 0.54  0.25  0.53  0.76  
Czech Republic 0.70  0.17  0.53  0.79  
Denmark 0.76  0.22  0.59  0.89  
Ecuador 0.53  0.28  0.41  0.64  
El Salvador 0.58  0.28  0.51  0.74  
France 0.89  0.19  0.78  0.88  
Germany 0.87  0.21  0.79  0.92  
Greece 0.75  0.16  0.59  0.86  
Hong Kong 0.82  0.20  0.72  0.89  
Hungary 0.78  0.21  0.64  0.88  
India 0.70  0.20  0.61  0.82  
Italy 0.83  0.17  0.78  0.86  
Japan 0.85  0.14  0.69  0.97  
Jordan 0.66  0.25  0.53  0.79  
Kazakhstan 0.59  0.27  0.45  0.84  
Kenya 0.56  0.23  0.42  0.69  
Korea, Rep. 0.87  0.09  0.81  0.91  
Latvia 0.56  0.25  0.45  0.71  
Lithuania 0.47  0.27  0.43  0.57  
Luxembourg 0.91  0.19  0.84  0.96  
Macao 0.76  0.21  0.58  0.94  
Macedonia, FYR 0.68  0.29  0.55  0.86  
Malaysia 0.76  0.12  0.71  0.79  
Mauritius 0.76  0.26  0.62  0.91  
Moldova 0.44  0.26  0.34  0.53  
Morocco 0.65  0.14  0.54  0.75  
Netherlands 0.81  0.17  0.74  0.84  
New Zealand 0.75  0.04  0.71  0.78  
Nigeria 0.49  0.24  0.34  0.65  
Pakistan 0.56  0.24  0.51  0.68  
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Panama 0.70  0.24  0.62  0.86  
Paraguay 0.45  0.30  0.30  0.63  
Peru 0.57  0.24  0.40  0.71  
Philippines 0.51  0.21  0.39  0.66  
Poland 0.59  0.23  0.47  0.70  
Portugal 0.84  0.19  0.71  0.94  
Romania 0.60  0.26  0.38  0.70  
Russian Federation 0.73  0.27  0.57  0.85  
Senegal 0.49  0.27  0.45  0.65  
Singapore 0.86  0.09  0.63  0.87  
Slovak Republic 0.63  0.25  0.53  0.93  
Slovenia 0.65  0.27  0.53  0.76  
South Africa 0.72  0.22  0.60  0.86  
Spain 0.91  0.17  0.85  0.89  
Sudan 0.55  0.33  0.39  0.78  
Sweden 0.79  0.19  0.55  0.85  
Switzerland 0.92  0.11  0.74  0.99  
Thailand 0.78  0.20  0.67  0.86  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.64  0.23  0.45  0.87  
Tunisia 0.64  0.22  0.59  0.86  
Turkey 0.75  0.25  0.62  0.88  
Ukraine 0.63  0.26  0.51  0.80  
United Kingdom 0.94  0.14  0.90  0.96  
United States 0.83  0.18  0.82  0.95  
Uruguay 0.65  0.26  0.48  0.97  
Venezuela 0.44  0.27  0.37  0.52  
Total 0.76  0.25  0.67  0.86  
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
Banking 
Efficiency 
Score 
Activities restrictions 
Overall 
capital 
stringency 
Average 
tenure of 
supervisors 
Independence of 
Supervisory 
Authority - Overall 
Official 
Supervisory 
Power 
Strength of 
external 
audit 
Certified 
Audit 
Required 
Activities restrictions -0.11*** 1.00       
Overall capital stringency  0.04 -0.16** 1.00      
Average tenure of supervisors  0.12** 0.18** -0.08** 1.00     
Independence of Supervisory Authority - 
Overall 0.03** -0.01 0.04* -0.08* 1.00    
Official Supervisory Power  0.04 0.25*** -0.06** 0.33** 0.21*** 1.00   
Strength of external audit 0.07** -0.09* 0.05* 0.28** -0.05** 0.30** 1.00  
Certified Audit Required 0.10** -0.15** 0.17** 0.19** 0.14** 0.22** 0.25*** 1.00 
Bank accounting informative 0.11*** 0.23*** -0.27** 0.34*** 0.12** 0.35** 0.18** -0.03* 
             Deposit insurance 
coverage / deposit per capita -0.12** 0.16** -0.01 0.08** -0.11** 0.10* 0.03 0.03 
HHI -0.15** -0.21** 0.06* 0.15** -0.10** 0.00 0.31* 0.01 
State-owned bank -0.23** -0.04* 0.07** -0.16** -0.11** -0.20** -0.21** 0.08** 
Bank size 0.34** 0.12** -0.11** 0.36** -0.01 0.09** 0.18** -0.07** 
Bank equity 0.08* -0.05* 0.03 -0.17** 0.02 0.01 -0.12 0.03* 
Inflation -0.28** 0.11** -0.01 -0.27** 0.06* 0.03* -0.15* 0.08** 
GDP per capita 0.25** -0.24** 0.16** 0.20** 0.05* -0.01 0.19** -0.03* 
GDP 0.22** -0.02 0.22** 0.08* 0.13** -0.02 -0.20** -0.04* 
 
Bank 
accounting 
informative 
Deposit insurance 
coverage/ deposit per 
capita 
HHI 
State 
Owned 
Bank 
Bank size Bank equity Inflation 
GDP per 
capita 
               Deposit insurance 
coverage / deposit per capita 0.05* 1.00       
HHI 0.04** 0.04** 1.00      
State Owned Bank -0.37*** 0.02 -0.16** 1.00     
Bank size 0.21** 0.08* 0.07* -0.27** 1.00     
Bank equity -0.07* -0.04** -0.01 0.15* -0.35** 1.00   
Inflation -0.06** 0.24*** -0.21** 0.31** -0.32** 0.21** 1.00  
GDP per capita 0.05* -0.11** 0.19** -0.39** 0.33** -0.20** -0.36*** 1.00 
GDP -0.11** -0.08** -0.26** -0.10** 0.22** -0.11** -0.20* 0.38*** 
Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
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Table 5. Regulation, Supervision, Private Monitoring and Bank Efficiency 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Activities restrictions -0.0192     -0.0126  
 [0.024]**    [0.034]** 
Overall capital stringency 0.0032     0.0027  
 [0.076]*    [0.148] 
Average tenure of supervisors  0.0038  0.0039   0.0051  
  [0.025]** [0.042]**  [0.031]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority   0.0312  0.0328   0.0294  
  [0.018]** [0.014]**  [0.037]** 
Official Supervisory Power  0.0053  0.0058   0.0042  
  [0.124] [0.351]  [0.380] 
Independence of Supervisory Authority × 
Official Supervisory Power   0.0042   0.0036  
   [0.018]**  [0.025]** 
Strength of external audit    0.0146  0.0110  
    [0.027]** [0.031]** 
Certified Audit Required    0.0395  0.0389  
    [0.038]** [0.048]** 
Bank accounting informative    0.0120  0.0119  
    [0.016]** [0.025]** 
Deposit insurance coverage/ deposit per capita    -0.0218  -0.0133  
    [0.020]** [0.018]** 
HHI -0.0127  -0.0122  -0.0121  -0.0127  -0.0116  
 [0.018]** [0.040]** [0.046]** [0.036]** [0.027]** 
Government owned banks -0.0032  -0.0030  -0.0035  -0.0032  -0.0025  
 [0.041]** [0.056]* [0.030]** [0.259] [0.035]** 
Log total Assets 0.0509  0.0474  0.0473  0.0492  0.0474  
 [0.073]* [0.054]* [0.030]** [0.015]** [0.019]** 
Equity / Total Assets 0.0055  0.0053  0.0055  0.0054  0.0052  
 [0.011]** [0.062]* [0.018]** [0.105] [0.077]* 
Inflation -0.0036  -0.0031  -0.0032  -0.0034  -0.0029  
 [0.016]** [0.071]* [0.059]* [0.053]* [0.031]** 
Log GDP per capita 0.0238  0.0256  0.0258  0.0233  0.0194  
 [0.024]** [0.079]* [0.026]** [0.066]* [0.030]** 
Log GDP 0.0071  0.0068  0.0070  0.0087  0.0084  
 [0.043]** [0.071]* [0.059]* [0.053]* [0.033]** 
Observations 8,115 8,069 8,069 8,143 8,069 
Countries 71 70 70 72 70 
Pseudo_R2 0.298 0.298 0.299 0.302 0.304 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is the bank efficiency score. The estimation is 
based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).  The sample is a 3-period panel based on 
the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, respectively. A constant is included but not 
reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of 
the independent variables. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected 
value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Instrumental variables regression results 
 1 2 3 4 
Activities restrictions -0.0391    -0.0272  
 [0.004]***   [0.016]** 
Overall capital stringency 0.0057    0.0046 
 [0.061]*   [0.129] 
Average tenure of supervisors  0.0073   0.0091  
  [0.013]**  [0.024]** 
Independence of Supervisory Authority  0.0639   0.0594  
  [0.023]**  [0.027]** 
Official Supervisory Power  0.0125   0.0105  
  [0.347]  [0.360] 
Independence of Supervisory Authority × 
Official Supervisory Power  0.0073   0.0076  
  [0.017]**  [0.028]** 
Strength of external audit   0.0295  0.0253  
   [0.041]** [0.018]** 
Certified Audit Required   0.0673  0.0792  
   [0.014]** [0.091]* 
Bank accounting informative   0.0289  0.0292  
   [0.021]** [0.014]** 
Deposit insurance coverage/ deposit per capita   -0.0422  -0.0295  
   [0.021]** [0.022]** 
HHI -0.0126  -0.0107  -0.0110  -0.0105  
 [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.039]** [0.032]** 
Government owned banks -0.0030  -0.0026  -0.0034  -0.0030  
 [0.069]* [0.075]* [0.067]* [0.023]** 
Log total Assets 0.0510  0.0456  0.0485  0.0464  
 [0.038]** [0.062]* [0.098]* [0.042]** 
Equity / Total Assets 0.0056  0.0054  0.0057  0.0056  
 [0.035]** [0.065]* [0.052]* [0.038]** 
Inflation -0.0036  -0.0027  -0.0033  -0.0025  
 [0.014]** [0.061]* [0.094]* [0.031]** 
Log GDP per capita 0.0249  0.0242  0.0145  0.0102  
 [0.044]** [0.070]* [0.083]* [0.043]** 
Log GDP 0.0059  0.0052  0.0053  0.0057  
 [0.034]** [0.091]* [0.037]** [0.088]* 
Observations 8,115 8,069 8,143 8,069 
Countries 71 70 72 70 
1st-stage F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-value of Hansen's overidentification J test 0.358 0.364 0.217 0.288 
Pseudo_R2 0.298 0.317 0.304 0.308 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is the bank efficiency score. Instrumental 
variables for bank regulations include ethnic fractionalization, latitude, religions, legal origins, and the average 
regulatory level of other countries in the sample in the time period. The estimation is based on a consistent IV 
estimation of limited dependent variable regressions (Newey, 1987, Wooldridge, 2002). The sample is a 
3-period panel based on the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, respectively. A constant 
is included but not reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects 
evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effect of a 
dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy 
variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Change Regression Results 
 1 2 3 4 
Δ Activities restrictions -0.0308    -0.0302  
 [0.031]**   [0.034]** 
Δ Overall capital stringency 0.0048    0.0031  
 [0.063]*   [0.152] 
Δ Average tenure of supervisors  0.0045   0.0043  
  [0.026]**  [0.032]** 
Δ Independence of Supervisory Authority - Overall  0.0481   0.0415  
  [0.033]**  [0.047]** 
Δ Official Supervisory Power  0.0063   0.0067  
  [0.431]  [0.218] 
Δ (Independence of Supervisory Authority × 
Official Supervisory Power)  0.0041   0.0047  
  [0.010]**  [0.024]** 
Δ Strength of external audit   0.0138  0.0141  
   [0.037]** [0.004]*** 
Δ Certified Audit Required   0.0370  0.0307  
   [0.032]** [0.038]** 
Δ Bank accounting informative   0.0126  0.0123  
   [0.023]** [0.027]** 
Δ (Deposit insurance coverage/ deposit per capita)   -0.0283  -0.0274  
   [0.017]** [0.016]** 
Δ HHI -0.0162  -0.0149  -0.0158  -0.0141  
 [0.017]** [0.029]** [0.023]** [0.038]** 
Δ Government owned banks -0.0022  -0.0024  -0.0027  -0.0021  
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Δ Log total Assets 0.0183  0.0172  0.0193  0.0192  
 [0.080]* [0.019]** [0.063]* [0.037]** 
Δ (Equity / Total Assets) 0.0035  0.0034  0.0034  0.0034  
 [0.028]** [0.086]* [0.014]** [0.033]** 
Δ Inflation -0.0019  -0.0023  -0.0022  -0.0026  
 [0.015]** [0.070]* [0.052]* [0.039]** 
Δ Log GDP per capita 0.0334  0.0372  0.0349  0.0425  
 [0.060]* [0.036]** [0.085]* [0.040]** 
Δ Log GDP 0.0022  0.0027  0.0025  0.0033  
 [0.020]** [0.067]* [0.081]* [0.026]** 
Observations 4,076  4,053  4,090  4,053  
Countries 71 70 72 70 
Pseudo_R2 0.156 0.178 0.156 0.182 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is the change in the bank efficiency score. 
The sample is a 3-period panel based on the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, 
respectively. Δ indicates the first-difference of the variable between two consecutive periods. The estimation 
is based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).  A constant is included but not 
reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means 
of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as 
the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 
1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are 
presented in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Results with more institutional controls 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Activities restrictions -0.0113  -0.0113  -0.0123  -0.0122  -0.0117  -0.0119  
 [0.033]** [0.057]* [0.084]* [0.035]** [0.039]** [0.034]** 
Overall capital stringency 0.0028  0.0030  0.0027  0.0029  0.0025  0.0028  
 [0.132] [0.154] [0.146] [0.083]* [0.128] [0.144] 
Average tenure of supervisors 0.0046  0.0045  0.0049  0.0046  0.0042  0.0043  
 [0.032]** [0.031]** [0.059]* [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.069]* 
Independence of Supervisory 
Authority - Overall 0.0315  0.0312  0.0304  0.0302  0.0323  0.0306  
 [0.037]** [0.064]* [0.036]** [0.038]** [0.079]* [0.032]** 
Official Supervisory Power 0.0046  0.0043  0.0044  0.0046  0.0042  0.0041  
 [0.391] [0.370] [0.390] [0.370] [0.393] [0.369] 
Independence of Supervisory 
Authority x Official Supervisory 
Power 
0.0036  0.0039  0.0032  0.0037  0.0038  0.0031  
 [0.024]** [0.026]** [0.063]* [0.026]** [0.024]** [0.072]* 
Strength of external audit 0.0107 0.0094  0.0106  0.0104  0.0093  0.0098  
 [0.058]* [0.037]** [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.061]* [0.030]** 
Certified Audit Required 0.0425  0.0426  0.0409  0.0412  0.0426  0.0415  
 [0.041]** [0.055]* [0.047]** [0.064]* [0.047]** [0.039]** 
Bank accounting informative 0.0131  0.0133  0.0125  0.0128  0.0136  0.0132  
 [0.023]** [0.062]* [0.024]** [0.032]** [0.023]** [0.057]* 
Deposit insurance coverage / deposit 
per capita -0.0120  -0.0119  -0.0128  -0.0121  -0.0120  -0.0124  
 [0.052]* [0.020]** [0.017]** [0.020]** [0.063]* [0.022]** 
HHI -0.0105  -0.0104  -0.0112  -0.0105  -0.0103  -0.0108  
 [0.026]** [0.038]** [0.074]* [0.063]* [0.028]** [0.026]** 
Government owned banks -0.0023  -0.0022  -0.0024  -0.0023  -0.0026  -0.0024  
 [0.036]** [0.060]* [0.034]** [0.038]** [0.036]** [0.054]* 
Log total Assets 0.0457  0.0455  0.0485  0.0466  0.0454  0.0459  
 [0.019]** [0.034]** [0.058]* [0.019]** [0.026]** [0.018]** 
Equity / Total Assets 0.0055  0.0057  0.0053  0.0054  0.0055  0.0054  
 [0.061]* [0.079]* [0.073]* [0.078]* [0.075]* [0.079]* 
Inflation -0.0026  -0.0022  -0.0028  -0.0026  -0.0027  -0.0023  
 [0.032]** [0.063]* [0.030]** [0.072]* [0.032]** [0.068]* 
Log GDP per capita 0.0177  0.0176  0.0188  0.0176  0.0179  0.0178  
 [0.053]* [0.029]** [0.031]** [0.062]* [0.031]** [0.029]** 
Log GDP 0.0081  0.0076  0.0082  0.0080  0.0077  0.0079  
 [0.034]** [0.053]* [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.063]* [0.038]** 
Control of Corruption 0.0259       
 [0.172]      
Government Effectiveness  0.0357      
  [0.143]     
Political Stability   0.0671     
   [0.328]    
Quality and Regulation    0.0205    
    [0.017]**   
Rule of Law      0.0254   
     [0.023]**  
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Voice and Accountability      0.0169  
      [0.062]* 
Observations 8069 8069 8069 8069 8069 8069 
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.307 0.304 0.305 0.307 0.305 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is the bank efficiency score. The estimation is 
based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).  The sample is a 3-period panel based on 
the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, respectively. A constant is included but not 
reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of 
the independent variables. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected 
value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Change in overall activities restrictions in countries (2006 vs. 1999) 
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Figure 2: Changes in overall capital stringency  in countries (2006 vs. 1999) 
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Figure 3: Changes in the strength of external audits in countries (2006 vs. 1999) 
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Figure 4: Changes in the informativeness of bank accounting information in countries (2006 vs. 
1999) 
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Figure 5: Changes in official supervisory power in countries (2006 vs. 1999) 
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Figure 6: Changes in supervisory independence in countries (2006 vs. 1999) 
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